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HowJurors Evaluate Fingerprint Evidence:
The Relative Importance of Match
Language, Method Information,
and Error Acknowledgment
Brandon Garrett and Gregory Mitchell*

Fingerprint examiners use a variety of terms and phrases to describe a finding of a match
between a defendant's fingerprints and fingerprint impressions collected from a crime
scene. Despite the importance and ubiquity of fingerprint evidence in criminal cases, no
prior studies examine howjurors evaluate such evidence. We present two studies examining
the impact of different match phrases, method descriptions, and statements about possible
examiner error on the weight given to fingerprint identification evidence by laypersons. In
both studies, the particular phrase chosen to describe the finding of a match-whether
simple and imprecise or detailed and claiming near certainty-had little effect on participants' judgments about the guilt of a suspect. In contrast, the examiner admitting the
possibility of error reduced the weight given to the fingerprint evidence-regardless of
whether the admission was made during direct or cross-examination. In addition, the
examiner providing information about the method used to make fingerprint comparisons
reduced the impact of admitting the possibility of error. We found few individual differences
in reactions to the fingerprint evidence across a wide range of participant variables, and we
found widespread agreement regarding the uniqueness of fingerprints and the reliability of
fingerprint identifications. Our results suggest that information about the reliability of
fingerprint identifications will have a greater impact on lay interpretations of fingerprint
evidence than the specific qualitative or quantitative terms chosen to describe a fingerprint
match.

1. INTRODUCTION
Forensic evidence gathered by crime scene investigators plays an important role in many
criminal cases (Durose 2005), and fingerprint impressions are the most common type of
forensic evidence used to link individuals to particular crimes (Peterson et al. 2010). The
popularity of fingerprint evidence is easy to understand: fingerprints are often left at crime
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scenes, suspects can be compelled to give fingerprint impressions to compare with crime
scene prints, and government agencies maintain large archives of fingerprints that can be
used in crime investigations. The FBI currently maintains a computerized national databank containing over 100 million fingerprints, and every year this database is used to
generate possible match candidates from the collected reference samples to aid in the
investigation of thousands of crimes.'
At a criminal trial involving fingerprint evidence, a fingerprint examiner will typically
testify that she followed a standard procedure for comparing prints recovered from the
crime scene to reference sample prints and opine that this procedure resulted in a conclusion that the defendant was the source of the crime scene prints (see, e.g., United States
v. Baines 2009). The ability of the fingerprint examiner to convince the jury of a fingerprint
match can be crucial to the outcome of a case. In recognition of the importance of
testimony by fingerprint examiners, a working group convened by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) recently
promulgated standards for the production and dissemination of fingerprint examiner
opinions, emphasizing that examiners should state their conclusions in a way that "will not
confuse or mislead the fact-finders" (NIST/NIJ 2012).
Scholars had for some time suggested that in addition to lacking adequate scientific
support, terminology commonly used by fingerprint examiners could have a significant and
misleading impact on jurors (e.g., Saks 2003; Koehler & Saks 2008; Cole 2011). The
National Research Council (NRC), in its recent report on forensic science, cited the
"profound effect" that the use of terms like "match" and "identical" and "cannot be
excluded as the source of" may have on jurors and worried that the lack of standardized
language could itself lead to differences in outcomes (NRC 2009:21). The NRC called for
the creation of a federal agency to establish standard scientific terminology for forensics,
but no legislation has been enacted. As one concerned and candid fingerprint examiner
put it after the NRC report: "We can't say what we used to say and we can't yet say what we
will say. What do we say in the meantime?" (Cole 2011:470). While the NIST/NIJ working
group was convened in part to address this concern, that group could not provide definitive
guidance on the terminology that fingerprint examiners should use when testifying about
a possible match because no prior research has investigated how actual or potential jurors
react to and understand the testimony of fingerprint examiners.
We present the results of two studies demonstrating that different ways of presenting
precisely the same fingerprint evidence can greatly affect the weight given to that evidence.
We find that these differences arise primarily from the way the possibility of an identification error is addressed by the examiner, rather than from the way a match or individualization conclusion is stated. Thus, while the recent NRC report on forensic science (NRC
2009) and the NIST/NIJ report (2012) are rightly concerned that different ways of

'The Automated Fingerprint Identification System, or AFIS, is a national database available to federal, state, and local
investigators. In addition to fingerprints, the database contains facial and tattoo photographs and descriptive
information that may be used to identify persons. For AFIS information, see <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/
cjis/fingerprints-biometrics/iafis/iafis> and <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerpnints-biometrics/iafis/iafis
facts>.
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presenting the same fingerprint evidence may lead to different interpretations of that
evidence, their focus on avoiding the false impression of great precision in fingerprint
identifications may be incomplete, or even misplaced. We find that modest and immodest
individualization claims by fingerprint examiners (e.g., simple match testimony vs. testimony expressing certitude in the match and claiming the risk of error is infinitesimal) are
often given the same weight by laypersons. The concern with false impressions of infallibility in fingerprint identifications, on the other hand, seems well-placed. Informing laypersons that a particular fingerprint identification could be mistaken appears to greatly
reduce the weight given to fingerprint examiner testimony. Our findings suggest that
courts, policymakers, and researchers should devote greater attention to developing
uniform standards for accurately measuring and describing the risk of identification errors
by fingerprint examiners.

11. THE ART

AND SCIENCE OF FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATIONS

Fingerprints have been used to identify people for well over a century (Cole 2001), but the
assumptions that underlie fingerprint identifications have been subjected to little scientific
testing. Fingerprint examiners assume that friction ridge patterns on the skin are unique to
each individual and that a partial fingerprint impression left at a crime scene can be reliably
linked to an individual through microscopic comparison of friction ridge patterns and
minutiae (Neumann et al. 2012). Because no objective method for assessing match probability is presently used by fingerprint examiners, such as a validated method based on
statistical analyses of combinations of fingerprint features (Neumann 2012), the comparison process requires a number of subjective judgments by an examiner regarding the
suitability of samples for comparison and the degree of similarity between the latent prints
and reference sample prints.2 This procedure can yield only qualitative individualization
judgments: the prints were unsuitable for comparison, the prints matched or did not
match, or the comparison produced inconclusive results. Recent studies have shown that
this procedure can be distorted by motivational and cognitive factors (Dror et al. 2006; Dror
& Rosenthal 2008). Although mistaken fingerprint identifications have come to light, there
are few public data on the frequency with which fingerprint identifications lead to falsenegative and false-positive errors (Tangen et al. 2011).
Despite the lack of an objective method for quantifying uncertainty and the dearth of
data on error rates, fingerprint examiners often testify that a positive match excludes all
others in the world as the source of the crime scene print and that their method is a form
of rigorous science that leads to infallible or nearly infallible conclusions (Cole 2011;

we refer to the examiner's "method," we use the term colloquially rather than to assert that examiners employ
a single systematic or scientific method. The NRC, in its recent report on forensic sciences, describes the analysis,
comparison, evaluation, and verification (ACE-V) steps used by many fingerprint examiners as "a broadly stated
framework for conducting friction ridge analyses" and states that "this framework is not specific enough to qualify as
a validated method for this type of analysis" (NRC Report 2009:142). We agree with the NRC's characterization of
ACE-V.
'When
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Geddes 2009, 2010; Neumann 2012). Scholars, and even some within the fingerprint
community, have long questioned the scientific basis for fingerprint examiners' claims
(e.g., Cole 2001, 2004; Cummings & Midlo, 1943; Mnookin 2001, 2008; Saks 2003; Stoney
& Thornton 1986; Stoney 1991), particularly the claim that the comparison process is
reliable and infallible, but these criticisms have had little impact on the practices of
fingerprint examiners or the judges who rule on the admissibility of their testimony (Saks
2009). The forensic science landscape changed dramatically, however, with the 2009 report
of the National Research Council Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic
Science Community (NRC Report).
The NRC Report provides an authoritative opinion from the scientific community
that a number of established forensic techniques, including individualization via fingerprint comparison, lack a rigorous scientific foundation and that there is little empirical
justification for language commonly used by forensic experts to describe the likelihood that
a particular suspect did or did not leave some type of forensic evidence at the scene of a
crime. Professional forensic science associations and federal government agencies immediately responded to the NRC Report by changing guidelines for forensic practices and
convening working groups to address the problems raised in the report (NIST/NIJ 2012).
A resolution recently approved by the American Bar Association (ABA) House of Delegates
encourages judges and lawyers to ensure that "experts present their testimony in a manner
that accurately and fairly conveys the significance of their conclusions" (ABA House of
Delegates 2012).
Unwarranted individualization claims are commonplace in known wrongful convictions (Garrett & Neufeld 2009), and the NRC Report expressed concern that the language
used by fingerprint examiners and other forensic scientists may "have a profound effect on
how the trier of fact . .. perceives and evaluates scientific evidence" (NRC 2009:21).
Consistent with the NRC's concern, prior studies have found that jury-eligible adults have
difficulty understanding expert testimony, particularly quantitative or statistical evidence
(e.g., Kaasa et al. 2007; Kaye & Koehler 1991; Koehler 2001). That body of research
suggested that jurors would give "unexpectedly heavy weight to the qualitative, subjective
testimony typical of most forensic identification expert evidence" (McQuiston-Surrett &
Saks 2009:438). However, no prior study has directly examined howjurors interpret qualitative match terminology used by fingerprint examiners.
The most closely related research examined howjudges and potentialjurors respond
to a forensic scientist's qualitative and quantitative descriptions of the results of bite mark
and hair comparisons. Conducting the first research of this kind, McQuiston-Surrett and
Saks (2008) found that simple testimony from a forensic dentist that the defendant's bite
pattern "matched" or was "consistent with" the bite mark found on the victim was more
powerful than when the expert stated that a match was "probable" or a "reasonable
scientific certainty," even though the latter terms are understood by the expert community
to express stronger conclusions of association. In a follow-up study, McQuiston-Surrett and
Saks (2009) found that qualitative testimony about a hair comparison in terms of a "match"

'NIST/NIJ calls such testimony "common practice" (2012:72).
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or "similar in all microscopic characteristics" led to significantly higher estimates of the
defendant as the source of the hair found at the crime scene than testimony stated in
probabilistic terms, such as when an expert stated a subjective probability that a person
chosen at random would have hair with the same characteristics as those found at the scene.
McQuiston-Surrett and Saks (2009) further found that informing participants of limitations
of the forensic expert's method, either through cross-examination or ajudicial instruction,
had no effect on participants' estimates that the defendant was the source of the hair found
at the crime scene.
Koehler (2011), in a study of potential jurors' reactions to testimony about a shoeprint match in a hypothetical criminal case, likewise found that risks of error brought out
on cross-examination of a forensic expert had no effect on the persuasiveness of the
expert's testimony. Koehler (2011) did find, however, that an expert who admitted a risk of
error during direct examination was less persuasive than an expert who made no such
concession. Contrary to McQuiston-Surrett and Saks (2009), Koehler (2011) found no
difference in the weight given to qualitative individualization testimony versus testimony in
the form of a probabilistic match statistic. Aside from the important work by McQuistonSurrett and Saks and Koehler, no further studies have been reported on nonquantified
forensic testimony.

STUDY 1: EXAMINING THE RANGE OF FINGERPRINT
EXAMINER TERMINOLOGY

III.

In addition to examining for the first time how laypersons interpret fingerprint examiner
testimony, the current research examined a much wider range of qualitative match terminology than previously studied. Fingerprint examiners employ a range of terms and phrases
to convey information about individualization via fingerprint evidence, about their methodology, and about the likelihood that their conclusion is in error (Cole 2011). Recommended terminology is found in the highly influential testimonial guidelines put forward
by the International Association for Identification (IAI) and the FBI's Scientific Working
Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology (SWGFAST) (NIST/NIJ 2012). In
criminal trials, however, examiners can vary in their adherence to such guidelines, and
so we examined recent criminal trial transcripts to find examples of such variations in
testimony.
Examiner testimony suggested by these guidelines and found in real trials may be
placed into four broad categories: simple positive match testimony, bolstered or elaborated
positive match testimony, inconclusive match testimony, and exclusion testimony. Table 1
displays examples of testimony falling within these categories. Simple positive match testimony presents an unadorned conclusion that the fingerprint evidence concluded that the
defendant left the print at the scene of the crime, usually through an explicit, unqualified
claim of individualization. Bolstered positive match testimony adds detail about the rigor of
the fingerprint examiner's method, about the low risk of error, or both. Some evidence
suggests that forensic analysts are not often subjected to cross-examination that highlights
the subjective nature of their comparisons and the risk of error (Garrett & Neufeld 2009).
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Examples of Fingerprint Examiner Terminology

Simple Positive Match
1. A latent fingerprint found at the scene was individualized as the left thumb of the defendant.
2. The latent fingerprint found at the scene matched the left thumb print on the ink card labeled as
taken from the defendant.
3. A latent fingerprint found at the scene was made by the same individual who made the left thumb
print on the ink card labeled as taken from the defendant.
4. I am confident that the defendant was the source of the latent fingerprint found at the crime scene.
5. I concluded that it is very likely that the defendant was the source of the latent fingerprint found at
the crime scene.
Bolstered Positive Match
6. I conclude to a practical certainty that the latent fingerprint found at the scene came from the same
source as the left thumb print on the ink card labeled as taken from the defendant.
7. I conclude to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty in the field of latent fingerprint examination
that the latent fingerprint found at the scene came from the same source as the left thumb print on
the ink card labeled as taken from the defendant.
8. I conclude to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that the latent fingerprint found at the scene
came from the same source as the left thumb print on the ink card labeled as taken from the defendant
9. The latent fingerprint found at the scene was individualized as the left thumb of the defendant. The
likelihood the impression was made by a different source is so remote that it is considered to be a
practical impossibility.
10. I concluded that the latent fingerprint found at the crime scene came from the same source as the left
thumb print on the ink card labeled as taken from the defendant. The chance of having two
individuals with the same fingerprint is one chance in 10 to the 86th power. That is more people and
more fingers than are on our planet today.
11. The latent fingerprint found at the scene of the crime was individualized as the left thumb of the
defendant. No two fingerprints have ever been found to be the same. The likelihood that the
impression was made by a different source is so remote that it is considered a practical impossibility.
Individualization is supported by the theories of biological uniqueness and permanence, probability
modeling, and empirical data gained through more than one hundred years of operational
experience.
Qualified or Inconclusive Match
12. The friction ridge impression did not have sufficient detail to permit a conclusion whether it
originated from the defendant or not. The result was inconclusive.
13. The latent fingerprint found at the scene was individualized as the left thumb of the defendant.
However, it is possible that the print in question could have come from someone else.
14. 1 cannot exclude the defendant as the source of the latent fingerprint found at the scene.
Exclusion
15. The friction ridge impression excluded the left thumb of the defendant and originated from a
different source.
NOTE: This table provides examples of testimony by fingerprint examiners. The examples were developed from a

variety of sources. No. 1: "individualization" is the now-standard term for a conclusion that the print can be matched
(SWGFAST 2011; NIJ/NIST 2012); No. 2: testimony reporting a "match" is the traditional conclusion reached in a
latent fingerprint comparison (e.g., Trial Transcript at 403, United States v. Baxier, F-5928-01 (D.C. Sup. Ct. June 16,
2003); see also Cole 2007:127); No. 3: based on an FBI examiner's testimony that a print "was made by the same
individual" (Trial Testimony at 105, United States v. I.atrell Gilchrist, No. F-2158-01 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Mar. 13, 2003); see
also Cole 2007:126); Nos. 4and 5: this type of source attribution testimony is apparently common (see Cole 2007:473);
the language of No.4 was based on testimony of an FBI analyst that "I am confident in the conclusion that I rendered"
(Hearing Transcript at 124, United States v. Faison,2008-CF2-16636 (D.C. Sup. Ct. May 27, 2010)); No. 8: courts have
required use of "reasonable scientific certainty" language for other forensic evidence and in at least one fingerprint
case and the sample language has been proposed for fingerprint cases (Cole 2011:472); No. 9: this language comes
directly from current SWGFAST guidelines (SWGFAST 2011); No. 10: this language comes directly from testimony of
a former FBI supervisor (Hearing Transcript at 50, United States v. Baines, No. 06-CR-1797 (D.N.M. Apr. 11, 2007)); No.
11: the added language regarding theoretical support for individualization comes directly from the 2009 SWGFAST
guidelines. In addition, the examples were developed from information provided by counsel who have participated
in criminal cases involving fingerprint evidence.
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In examples of actual testimony we have obtained, when error was discussed by fingerprint
examiners, it was typically to downplay the risk of error, as illustrated in the examples in
Table 1, rather than to disclose risks of misidentification that the jury should take into
account when weighing the evidence. Also, government experts may present inconclusive
match testimony or testimony that the fingerprint evidence excluded the defendant. Since
cases in which probative fingerprint evidence excludes the defendant would be less likely to
go to trial, our focus here is on incriminating fingerprint evidence offered in support of the
prosecution.
The NRC Report (2009) focused on the manner in which individualization conclusions are expressed, and, as Table I illustrates, examiners employ a range of qualitative
terms that may lead to different interpretations of the same results of a fingerprint comparison. But as Table I also illustrates, examiner testimony often contains more information than a bare conclusion individualizing a latent print, and this additional information
may impact how the conclusion is interpreted. Our first study compared the impact of these
different ways of phrasing the bare conclusion and of bolstering this bare conclusion with
statements about the examiner's method and its precision and reliability.
In particular, the first study examined whether different ways of phrasing a positive
match caused different weights to be given to the fingerprint evidence. The standard
fingerprint comparison procedure (known as Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification, or ACE-V) results in a subjective judgment by the examiner of individualization,
exclusion, or inconclusive (e.g., SWGFAST 2011). In theory, the different ways of describing an individualization conclusion should be given equal weight because the process
involves no objective evaluation of the reliability or precision of the match (Neumann
2012). Research into lay meanings attached to linguistic probabilities finds consistent
rank orderings of verbal quantifiers across persons but different numerical probabilities
attached to particular verbal quantifiers (e.g., poor chance tends to be ranked below good
chance, but the particular numerical probabilities assigned to each phrase vary widely
across persons) (Dhami & Wallsten 2005; Honda &Yamagishi 2006). This research has not
examined interpretations of phrases meant to convey degree of similarity, such as a "match"
or "likely match" between two fingerprints. Nevertheless, we predicted that participants'
beliefs that a defendant committed a crime would reflect similar weighting of fingerprint
evidence regardless of the simple match terminology used when those beliefs were measured on a simple qualitative scale. However, we predicted that the numerical probabilities
assigned to the likelihood that the defendant left his prints at the scene would vary more
widely across individuals, making it more likely that the match terminology used would
affect the weight assigned to evidence on a quantitative scale (i.e., we predicted consistency
across match terms on the qualitative measure of guilt, but inconsistency across terms on
the quantitative measure of the probability that the defendant left his prints at the scene).
The first study also examined whether bolstering simple match terminology with
method information, claims of certitude, or low-error-risk information would increase the
weight given to fingerprint evidence. On the one hand, such information should have no
impact on the weight given to fingerprint evidence if people generally assume fingerprint
examiners' conclusions are accurate and reliable. On the other hand, bolstering may
increase the weight given to positive match testimony if people do not assume that all or
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most fingerprint identifications are precise and reliable or if making the foundation for the
identification explicit signals special reliability or confidence on the part of the examiner.
The first study asked three additional questions. First, does exclusion testimony or
testimony about an inconclusive fingerprint comparison adversely affect the prosecution's
case relative to a baseline control condition in which no fingerprint evidence was used? It
is possible that the prosecution, by affirmatively addressing a lack of fingerprint evidence in
its case-in-chief can blunt the impact of negative match testimony presented by a defense
expert, but it is also possible that the prosecution will undercut its own case by putting on
evidence of an inconclusive or negative match. We examined this possibility by including
conditions in which the prosecution puts on in its case-in-chief inconclusive and negative
fingerprint evidence (or an "exclusion," as an examiner would put it).
Second, do individuals differ predictably in the weight given to fingerprint evidence?
Numerate individuals, or those who show greater facility working with numerical concepts,
differ from innumerate individuals in their behavior on a number of judgment and
decision-making tasks (Peters 2012; Peters et al. 2006), including being less trusting of
verbal risk assessments (Gurmankin et al. 2004). Kaasa et al. (2007) found that mockjurors
who were confident in their ability to evaluate statistical evidence used probabilistic evidence of a ballistic match more appropriately than those who were less confident in their
statistical ability. We predicted that more numerate participants would appreciate the
inherently probabilistic nature of fingerprint evidence regardless of the language used to
convey an individualization conclusion (i.e., the ACE-V process can produce only subjective
beliefs about the likelihood of a match) and would thus be less trusting of this evidence and
give the evidence less weight than less numerate individuals. We also expected more
numerate individuals to be less influenced by bolstering testimony that seeks to treat the
fingerprinting process as nearly infallible given a greater understanding of probabilities
and probabilistic processes (i.e., we predicted that bolstering would have no impact on
weights assigned to the evidence by more numerate individuals but would impact innumerate individuals). In addition to numeracy, we gathered information on demographic and
political differences among participants to examine whether demographic subgroups or
political groups differed in their interpretations of fingerprint examiner testimony.
Third, do laypersons assume that fingerprint patterns are "unique" to individuals? In
particular, laypersons may assume that not only are fingerprint patterns unique to individuals but, second, that the impressions that those fingerprints make can themselves
reliably be identified as deriving from a common and single unique source. That second
assumption, that accuracy in a given case can be inferred from uniqueness, has been called
a "fallacy" in the scholarly literature (Koehler & Saks 2008; Cole 2004). The accuracy of an
identification depends not only on the existence of identifiable differences across all
persons, but also on the quality of the latent prints left at a crime scene and the reliability
of the comparison method (i.e., an expert identification depends both on the reliability of
the expert's method and diagnosticity of the evidence) (Kaasa et al. 2007; Schum 1994). Yet
laypersons may fail to appreciate that biological uniqueness does not connote identification
accuracy. If people have not considered that latent prints may not always be reliably linked
to a pristine print, and instead assume that it is straightforward to assess whether a print
came from a unique source, an assumption of uniqueness should increase their receptivity
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to fingerprint evidence. For if one assumes that accuracy in a given case can be inferred
from "uniqueness," then the fingerprint examiner's task is likely seen as simply determining
whether this defendant left his unique marks at the scene (i.e., the reference class is a single
individual). In contrast, if one does not assume that accuracy in a given case can be inferred
from "uniqueness," then the weight given to fingerprint identifications should vary with
one's assumptions about base rate similarities in fingerprint patterns (Koehler & Saks
2010).
A. Method

1. Participants
Participants were recruited online through Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk (MTurk)
service (N= 1,252; 45.9 percent female; Ma, = 31.7).' One group of participants received
25 cents (in U.S. dollars) for their participation (n = 846), and a second group of participants received 50 cents (in U.S. dollars) for their participation (n= 406). The majority of
participants were from the United States (n =604) and India (n= 495). We report the
results for all participants because geographic location of the participant and participant
payment rate had no effect on the results (i.e., the same patterns hold when we examine
only the U.S. participants and when we compare the participants receiving 25 cents vs.
50 cents).5
2. Procedure and Materials
After their informed consent, participants provided demographic information (age, sex,
education, race/ethnicity as either European American or not, and country location),
described their political views on a five-point scale (from very liberal to middle of the road

'The use of data collected through MTurk is becoming common within psychology and the other social sciences
(Bohannon 2011; Mason & Sun 2012). Buhrmester et al. (2011) found that MTurk samples were equally or more
diverse than college student samples and were more representative of noncollege populations. They also found that
data collected through MTurk met or exceeded the psychometric standards of published research and found, as did
we, that small differences in payment rates had no effect on responses. Paolacci et al. (2010) found that MTurk
participants paid at least as much attention to experiment instructions and details as participants drawn from college
participant pools, and gave responses very similar to traditional participants on a series ofjudgmenst and decisionmaking tasks.
'Authorities in India utilize fingerprint identifications in much the same way as in the United States. In fact, the first
criminal trial involving fingerprint evidence occurred in India in 1898, and in the 1890s, British Colonial Police
developed and popularized the "Henry System," the leading fingerprint classification system, which was subsequently
adopted in Britain by Scotland Yard and then "spread across the world" (Cole 2001). India has had a Centralized
Finger Print Bureau (CFPB) since 1955, but is in the process of integrating regional fingerprint databases and
creating a national database along the lines of the FBI's AFIS databank (Shastri 2012). For more information on the
CFPB, see <http://ncrb.nic.in/cfpb.htm>. India is also in the process of creating a centralized fingerprint and
biometrics databank (Sharma 2011), and has scanned over 200 million people as part of a process of creating national
identification cards with fingerprint and iris scan information. For information on the Unique Identification Authority of India, see <http://uidai.gov.in/>. Twenty participants were from England, and 18 participants were from
Canada; authorities in both England and Canada also rely heavily on fingerprint identifications. It is not unusual that
the great majority of our participants came from the United States and India because Amazon only allows payment
in U.S. dollars or Indian rupees (Mason & Suri 2012).
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to very conservative), and stated which political party they typically vote for if in the United
States. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of 16 conditions that presented a
description of a hypothetical robbery that is the subject of a pending trial (ns varied from
75 to 80 participants per condition). The control condition simply described a crime for
which a suspect had been arrested.
A convenience store was robbed. The robber wore a mask and used a gun. The police arrested a
person who was found in the vicinity shortly after the robbery. No proceeds of the crime were
found on this person, and the clerk at the convenience store has not been able to identify this
person as the robber because the robber wore a mask.
No other information about the prosecution's evidence against the defendant was provided
in the control condition.
The 15 other conditions provided information about fingerprint evidence collected
from the scene that was compared to fingerprint samples obtained from the defendant. The
15 variations on fingerprint examiner testimony found in Table I were used in the 15
conditions in which fingerprint evidence information was provided to participants. For
instance, in the condition providing simple individualization language (Example I in
Table 1), participants received the following additional information.
At the trial of this case, the prosecution will present the testimony of a fingerprint examiner. The
fingerprint examiner will testify as follows at trial:
I received a set of latent fingerprints taken from the crime scene. I compared these to the
known fingerprints taken from the defendant on an inked card. A latent fingerprint found at
the scene was individualized as the left thumb of the defendant.'
After reading the short case description, all participants were asked to rate the
likelihood that the defendant committed the crime on a seven-point scale (1= the defendant definitely is not the robber; 4= each option is equally likely (i.e., there is a 50 percent
chance the defendant is not the robber and a 50 percent chance the defendant is the
robber); 7 = the defendant definitely is the robber) and were asked to rate their confidence
in that judgment on a five-point scale (1 = no confidence at all; 3= moderate confidence;
5 = complete confidence (no doubt at all)). Participants in the 15 conditions in which
fingerprint evidence information was provided (i.e., all but the control condition, which
contained no fingerprint information) were then asked to rate the probability that the
defendant left his fingerprints at the scene of the crime on a 0-100 probability scale.
After completing the questions about the hypothetical case, participants were
asked, "[d]o you believe that each person's fingerprints are unique (i.e., do not match
anyone else's fingerprints)?", with responses to this question either yes or no. Finally,
participants completed the eight-item Subjective Numeracy Scale (Zikmund-Fisher et al.

'The note to Table I includes sources for these variations. Three of the 15 variations, for example, used the term
"individualization" (one of the five "simple" variations and two of the "bolstered" variations) because it is the term
adopted in professional guidelines, and because we observed its use in testimony. Other variations reflected standard
language contained in professional guidelines, or variations in testimony by examiners at criminal trials.
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Table 2:

Dependent Measure Means by Testimony Condition (Study 1)

Fingerfnint Examiner
Testimony Condition

Likelihood Defendant Was
Robber (1-7 Scale) M (SD)

Control
3.16
Simple positive match
I
4.28
4.54
2
3
4.34
4
4.40
5
4.36
Bolstered positive match
4.52
6
7
4.40
8
4.26
9
4.36
10
4.57
11
4.56
Qualified or inconclusive match
12
3.03
3.50
13
14
3.56
Exclusion
15
3.06

Confidence in Likelihood
Judgment (1-5 Scale) M (SD)

ProbablityDefendant Lefi
Fingerprintsat Scene (0-100
Scale) M (SD)

(1.14)

3.42 (0.93)

(1.35)
(1.22)
(1.22)
(1.38)
(1.22)

3.19
3.25
3.25
3.22
3.24

(0.88)
(0.84)
(0.86)
(0.99)
(1.01)

63.67
63.84
62.48
64.99
62.40

(23.09)
(27.97)
(23.30)
(24.52)
(24.52)

(1.34)
(1.40)
(1.27)
(1.42)
(1.34)
(1.43)

3.30
2.99
3.04
3.21
3.40
3.39

(0.97)
(0.98)
(0.93)
(0.95)
(0.92)
(0.80)

64.92
63.71
60.28
66.03
66.53
70.04

(25.78)
(23.98)
(24.08)
(26.29)
(23.79)
(25.47)

(1.13)
(1.18)
(1.02)

3.15 (1.01)
3.09 (1.00)
3.01 (0.91)

37.66 (23.17)
48.71 (25.57)
49.56 (23.46)

(1.30)

3.15 (0.96)

41.96 (28.06)

NoTE: This table reports means on the dependent measures used in Study I by the type of testimony given by the
fingerprint examiner. The control condition contained no fingerprint examiner testimony; the numbers in the
Testimony Condition column correspond to the examples of testimony given by fingerprint examiners that are found
in Table 1.

2007) (Moat

numeracy sore=

4.48, SD= 0.87, n= 1,147; 1b

mitrysubcale=
4.52, SD= 1.09, n= 1,184;

Mpreference subscle= 4.44, SD= 0.94, n= 1,194).

B. Results
We employed a series of planned comparisons to examine whether different ways of
phrasing the fingerprint examiner's conclusion affected the weight given to the fingerprint
evidence. In particular, we compared responses across the testimonial categories identified
in Table I (e.g., average ratings on dependent measures in response to simple positive
match testimony vs. bolstered positive match testimony), and we compared responses to
particular forms of testimony within the testimonial categories (e.g., ratings in response to
inconclusive match testimony vs. exclusion testimony).' Table 2 presents the mean ratings

'We took this approach rather than reporting all pair-wise comparisons because the latter approach would involve
many comparisons, due to the number of experimental conditions, and thus inflate the risk of Type I error (falsely
rejecting the null hypothesis of no difference). In contrast, an approach that controls for the family-wise error rate,
such as a Bonferroni correction, would lead to underpowered tests of the null hypothesis (i.e., would make Type II
errors more likely).
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on each of our three main dependent measures for all 16 experimental conditions, and
below we discuss the results of the planned comparisons.
Ratings of the likelihood that the defendant committed the crime and of the probability that he left his fingerprints at the crime scene differed significantly across testimonial
categories, F(4, 1,244) =56.16, p<0.001, partial 11=0.153, and IR3, 1,169) =49.25,
p< 0.001, partial 12 = 0.112, respectively, but participants' confidence in theirjudgments of
guilt did not, F(4, 1,242) = 2.20, p= 0.067, 12= 0.007 (below we do discuss two individual
differences in confidence ratings). Participants who received simple positive match testimony or bolstered positive match testimony did not differ in their judgments of the
likelihood that the defendant was the robber (M= 4.38 vs. M= 4.45) or in the probabilities
that they assigned to the defendant having left prints at the crime scene (M= 63.46
vs. M = 65.23), t(855) = -0.697, p = 0.486, and t(857) = -1.043, p= 0.297, respectively.
However, participants who received qualified or inconclusive match testimony rated the
likelihood that the defendant committed the robbery (M= 3.36) and left his prints at the
scene (M= 45.41) significantly lower than those who received simple or bolstered positive
match testimony, all i > 8.89 and all ps < 0.001.
Participants who received qualified or inconclusive match testimony rated the likelihood that the defendant committed the robbery significantly higher than participants who
received the exclusion testimony, t(311) = 1.892, p< 0.05, but their print probabilities did
not differ significantly from those in the exclusion condition. This lack of a significant
difference on the print probability dependent measure appears to have been the result of
a floor effect at work in the exclusion and inconclusive match conditions, where the
probability ratings did not differ significantly (M= 41.96 vs. M= 37.66, t(154) = -1.042,
p= 0.299).' Participants reacted differently, however, to the inconclusive fingerprint examination (Row 12 in Table 2) versus the testimony by the examiner stating that the defendant
could not be excluded as the source of the print (Row 14 in Table 2), t(153) = -3.067,
p<0.001 on robber likelihood and t(154) = -3.187, p<0.001 on print probability. Thus,
participants' ratings were sensitive to whether the examiner made any match at all, but
when inconclusive or exclusion match testimony was given, participants' ratings on the
dependent measures did not go below the baseline that seemed to be set by the simple fact
that the prosecution had brought a case against this defendant for some reason.
We also compared what we viewed as the simplest positive match testimony (Example
2 from Table 1) with more elaborate versions of positive match testimony, which, a priori,
we expected to have a greater influence on potential jurors by bolstering the certainty and
precision of the match made by the examiner (specifically, Examples 9, 10, and 11 from
Table 1). To our surprise, none of these bolstered matches produced significantly higher
ratings on any of our three main dependent measures, all is < 1.50. To verify this result, we
also compared these three elaborated matches to the simple individualization testimony
(Example I from Table 1), and again no significant differences were found on any of the
dependent measures, all is < 1.64.

'As further evidence of a floor effect, the control, inconclusive, and exclusion conditions did not differ with respect
to the ratings given to the likelihood that the defendant was the robber, with all is < 1.05.
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Finally, we examined the impact of the examiner admitting that fingerprints from a
person other than the defendant might also match the prints found at the crime scene
(Example 13 in Table 1). The average likelihood that the defendant was the robber in this
condition was significantly lower than the average rating given in the simple positive match
condition, t(155) = 5.453, p < 0.001, but did not differ from the average rating given in the
control condition, where no fingerprint evidence was presented, t(155) = -1.813, p= 0.072.
Interestingly, compared to the control condition, participants' confidence in their ratings
of guilt were significantly lower in the condition where a fingerprint match had been made
but the prospect of another match had been made explicit, t(155) = 2.135, p<0.05. In
other words, when the examiner expressly conceded that another person could have
supplied the prints taken from the crime scene, it was as if there had been no fingerprint
evidence introduced at all, and participants lost some confidence in their guilt judgments
as they discounted the examiner's testimony.
To examine possible individual differences in responses, regression analyses were run
for each of the dependent measures that included as explanatory variables demographic
information, political information, and subjective numeracy scores, controlling for the
influence of experimental condition.' With respect to ratings of the likelihood that the
defendant was the robber, only self-placement on the liberalism-conservatism scale
approached significance (P/= 0.057, p= 0.069).
With respect to confidence ratings, race (P= 0.057, p<0.001) and numeracy
(P = 0.066, p < 0.05) accounted for significant amounts of variance. An examination of the
condition means by race (coded as European American or not) revealed that those selfidentifying as European American expressed less confidence in their likelihood ratings
than those who did not self-identify as European American only in the condition utilizing
the simple individualization terminology (Example I from Table 1): mean confidence of
2.95 versus 3.40, t(75) = -2.314, p<0.05. An examination of the condition means by
median and tertile splits of subjective numeracy scores revealed no significant differences
in confidence ratings across experimental conditions. Thus, the significant correlation
between subjective numeracy scores and confidence ratings (r= 0.069, p= 0.020) indicates
that those who reported higher subjective numeracy tended to express greater confidence,
across conditions, in their ratings of the likelihood that the defendant was the robber.
With respect to individual differences in ratings of the probability that the defendant
left his prints at the scene, race (P = -0.115, p< 0.001) and numeracy (P= 0.119, p< 0.001)
again explained significant amounts of variance. Higher subjective numeracy scores were
related to higher probability estimates across conditions (r= 0.142, p< 0.001). The difference in probability ratings between high and low subjective numeracy scorers was significantly different only in the simple match terminology condition (Example 2 in Table 1)
(mean ratings of 58.00 vs. 73.00, t(72) = -2.32, p < 0.05). An examination of the condition
means by race revealed that those self-identifying as European American gave significantly
higher probability ratings than those who did not self-identify as European American in a

9

The results of ordinary least squares regression are presented for all three dependent measures; similar results were
found using ordinal regression on the robber likelihood and confidence measures.
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number of conditions involving positive match or bolstered positive match testimony
(Condition 1: 71.13 vs. 56.17; Condition 5: 70.76 vs. 54.00; Condition 6: 72.46 vs. 58.44;
Condition 8: 66.87 vs. 55.48; Condition 9: 73.86 v. 59.15; all Ps < 0.05, with Bonferroni
correction applied for multiple pair-wise comparisons). In no condition did non European
Americans give significantly higher probability estimates than European Americans.
Finally, the overwhelming majority of respondents believed that fingerprints were
unique to individuals. Approximately 93 percent of all respondents indicated a belief in
fingerprint uniqueness (1,142 out of 1,231 responses). Among U.S.-only respondents, 97
percent (581/598) indicated a belief in fingerprint uniqueness.
C. Discussion

The results in Study 1 show that the particular language used by a fingerprint examiner to
describe a match may not have the influence on jurors that has been widely supposed. The
most exaggerated or bolstered match testimony did not lead to higher guilt ratings than the
simple positive match testimony alone, but positive match testimony paired with an admission that someone other than the defendant could be the source of the match led to
significantly lower guilt ratings than unqualified match testimony. These results suggest
that participants were more attentive to the risk of error than to the particular language
used to describe a match and suggest an asymmetry in how fingerprint matches are viewed
by jurors: bolstering a match with even extravagant claims about the certainty of the match
and dismissals of the likelihood that someone else supplied the prints did not increase the
weight given to the match, yet simply acknowledging the possibility of a mismatch significantly undercut the probative value of the supposed match, to the point that the fingerprint
evidence was fully discounted. For the mock jurors in Study 1, an unqualified match was
given considerable weight regardless of the certitude with which the match was stated, but
testimony by the examiner who admitted the possibility of a mistake was given no weight.
Generally, judgments of guilt as measured on an ordinal Likert scale and ratings of
the probability the defendant left his prints at the crime scene as measured on a continuous
probability scale were in accord: as ordinal ratings of guilt increased, probability ratings
increased, and there was a surprising level of agreement on both dependent measures
within testimonial categories. This agreement between the ordinal and continuous dependent measures among participants receiving similar forms of testimony suggests that there
may be shared understandings of the quantitative significance of a qualitative match: when
confronted with an unqualified match, participants moved slightly above the midpoint on
the Likert scale, toward guilt, and assigned a probability of approximately 66 percent to the
prospect of the defendant having left fingerprints at the crime scene; when confronted with
an exclusion, an inconclusive result, or a qualified match, participants moved slightly below
the midpoint on the Likert scale to a point indistinguishable from the baseline set in
the control condition and assigned print probabilities below 50 percent. The level of
agreement on both dependent measures within the positive match testimonial categories
further supports the view that once an unqualified match had been made, adornment of
the match information adds little probative value in the mind of potential jurors (cf.
McQuiston-Surrett & Saks 2008, 2009).
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Exclusion testimony by a fingerprint examiner reduced the defendant's guilt rating
relative to that found in the qualified and inconclusive testimony conditions, but the
exclusion did not harm the prosecution's case relative to the baseline established in the
control condition (i.e., judgments of likelihood the defendant was the robber were not
significantly lower than in the control condition). It may be, with respect to the exclusion, that participants assumed the prosecution had other, undisclosed evidence in order
to take the case to trial, leading participants to discount this negative fingerprint evidence. That possibility raises a separate set of questions, and more work needs to be
performed to understand whether jurors may assume that the prosecution has a stronger
case than is apparent at trial. In addition, more work needs to be performed to understand how jurors interpret a forensic exclusion and what assumptions they may make to
reduce the impact of such evidence. We do not want to make too much of a finding from
a single simple hypothetical case, but this result tentatively indicates that the prosecution
may be able to blunt the impact of negative fingerprint evidence by disclosing it before
the defense does. The finding also suggests the potential importance, from a defense and
a judicial perspective, of explaining to the jury the significance of a forensic exclusion.
Contrary to our prediction, individuals reporting greater preference for and ability
with numbers gave greater weight to fingerprint evidence than subjectively less numerate
individuals (where weight was measured by ratings of the probability that the defendant
left his prints at the scene of the crime). Subjectively numerate individuals did not draw
finer distinctions between the different forms of examiner testimony: across the board,
numerate individuals seemed to be more accepting of fingerprint evidence than innumerate individuals, and those more confident in their numeracy were more confident in
their guilt judgments. Had the evidence been more mathematically complex, perhaps
subjective numeracy would have mattered more, or differently. And although the subjective numeracy scale has been validated (e.g., Zikmund-Fisher et al. 2007), perhaps an
objective measure of numeracy (e.g., Lipkus et al. 2001) would have produced different
results.
We also found differences by race, with those of European-American descent (traditionally thought of as whites) giving greater weight to the positive fingerprint evidence on
the probability scale. This finding does not appear to be due to different levels of confidence in one's judgments because there was only one condition in which our two racial
groups differed in confidence, with European Americans showing less confidence in their
judgments in this condition. This finding may reflect greater suspicion of government
evidence among minority groups, but our results do not allow us to say with confidence
what mechanisms account for this result.
Finally, parties offering fingerprint evidence may benefit from a widespread assumption among jurors that no two fingerprints are alike. Although we did not conduct a
representative survey of any population, almost all the participants in our large and very
diverse sample reported that they believed that fingerprints are unique to individuals. This
assumption, which should increase the probative value of a supposed fingerprint match,
makes lay understanding of the reliability of the match process, rather than the specific
language used to convey match information, central to interpretations of fingerprint
examiner testimony.
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IV. STUDY 2: A

CLOSER LOOK AT THE EFFECT OF METHOD
AND ERROR INFORMATION
Study 1 compared the effects of a wide range of examiner testimony and found that
bolstering positive match testimony had little positive impact on probative value but qualifying a match negatively impacted the weight given to fingerprint evidence. Study 2 sought
to replicate this result but also to compare systematically the effects of match certitude,
method information, error information, and the manner of disclosing the possibility of
examiner error.
The match certitude comparison examines whether adding qualitative language
about the small likelihood of a source other than the defendant providing the fingerprint
impressions would increase the weight given to simple individualization testimony. The
bolstering language we tested was based on SWGFAST guidelines that permit an examiner
to claim that her individualization renders another source a "practical impossibility." In the
terminology of the NIST/NIJ (2012) report, we compared a "specific individualization"
claim to a "global individualization" claim.
Study I's results suggested that an important feature of fingerprint testimony may be
how the examiner's method, particularly its reliability, is described, but Study I did not test
the impact of an extended description of method. Nor have prior studies provided detailed
method descriptions to participants. Accordingly, for Study 2, we added to the examiner's
testimony a description of the ACE-V process based on SWGFAST's summary of fingerprint
examiner methodology. Our hypothesis was that a fairly standard method description
would add weight to the fingerprint testimony by making the comparison process appear
careful and precise. Since examiners do not have an explicit statistical or mathematical
basis for their work and cannot point to any objective test results to support their conclusions, the description of the method is likely to focus on the uniqueness of fingerprints and
the standard procedure to be followed carefully by the examiner, implicitly downplaying
the subjective judgments involved in this method and highlighting the confidence of the
examiner in the conclusions reached.
Of course, because the ACE-V process is "based largely on human interpretation"
(NRC Report 2009:139), it is susceptible to human error. The NRC Report (2009) noted
a series of subjective decisions in the fingerprint comparison process, including judgments about the difference between a "discrepancy" versus a "distortion" and about the
number of differences that are disregarded as "explainable." Crucially, the NRC Report
noted that it is an "unrealistic" and "scientifically implausible" assumption that a method
could have a zero error rate (NRC 2009:142-43). Shortly after that report was released,
the IAI issued guidance that examiners should no longer claim a zero error rate (LAl
2010), and the NIST/NIJ report (NIST/NIJ 2012) likewise recommended that examiners
not claim a zero error rate and that they describe steps taken to minimize sources of
error.
While fingerprint examiners are now cautioned by the leading professional associations against claiming infallibility, it is not clear what they should say about the prospect of
error because there is little research on error rates in general and few examiners have
undergone proficiency testing (NIST/NIJ 2012). To examine how different admissions of
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error by the fingerprint examiner may affect the weight given to the fingerprint evidence,
we compared the impact of two types of error statements by an examiner: one statement,
based on examples of actual examiner testimony, acknowledged the abstract possibility of
error but then claimed near infallibility on the part of this examiner;'o another statement
admitted that examiners can make errors and that it therefore must be conceded that the
identification in this case could be in error." In light of the mixed findings on error
disclosure between Koehler (2011) and McQuiston-Surrett and Saks (2009), we further
tested whether error statements would have an effect when brought out on direct examination versus cross-examination.
A. Method

1. Participants and Design
Participants were recruited online through Amazon.com's MTurk service and were paid 50
cents for their participation (N= 689; 57.8 percent female; Mage = 33.2). Participation in
this study was restricted to U.S. residents. Participants were randomly assigned to a control
condition or to one of 16 conditions produced by a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 full factorial betweensubjects design: two levels of match certitude (simple individualization testimony vs. bolstered individualization testimony), two levels of method information (information about
fingerprint examiner method provided or not), two levels of error information (risk of
error discounted vs. risk of error acknowledged), and two means of error disclosure (error
information provided during direct examination or during cross-examination).
2. Procedure and Materials
After giving informed consent, participants provided demographic information (age, sex,
education, race/ethnicity as either European American or not, and country location),
described their political views on a five-point scale (from very liberal to middle of the road
to very conservative), and stated which political party they typically support. All participants
then received a short description of a hypothetical crime and its suspect.
a. Control Condition. Participants assigned to the control condition received the following
description.
A convenience store was robbed. The robber wore a mask and used a gun. The police arrested a
person who was found in the vicinity shortly after the robbery. No proceeds of the crime were
found on this person, and the clerk at the convenience store has not been able to identify this

"Simon Cole describes cases in which the fingerprint examiner described the risk of error as purely "theoretical" or
"infinitesimal" (Cole 2011:472).
"Given the dearth of data on error rates associated with the ACE-V process, we did not commit our hypothetical
examiner to any particular error rate; rather, he simply admits that an error in the individualization conclusion is
possible.
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person as the robber because the robber wore a mask. The robber did not fire the gun and
dropped the gun when running out of the store after the robbery."
Participants assigned to one of the experimental conditions received the same
description, plus information about the prosecution's fingerprint evidence, which varied
depending on the level of the match certitude, method information, error information,
and error disclosure variables.

i. Match certitude. Those participants in the simple individualization condition received
the following additional information.
Fingerprint impressions were found on the handle of the gun. At the trial of this case, the
prosecution presented the testimony of a fingerprint examiner who examined those prints. The
fingerprint examiner testified as follows at trial:
I collected a set of fingerprint impressions from the gun found at the crime scene and
determined that one fingerprint was suitable for comparison. I compared this fingerprint to
the known fingerprints taken from the defendant on an inked card. The fingerprint found on
the gun was individualized as the right thumb of the defendant.
Participants in the bolstered individualization condition received the above information
and were also told that "[t]he likelihood the impressions were made by a different source
is so remote that it is considered to be a practical impossibility." This bolstering language
was taken from current SWGFAST guidelines for fingerprint examiner testimony.

ii. Method information. Participants in the method information condition received the
following description of fingerprint comparisons at the beginning of the fingerprint examiner's direct testimony.
To understand my testimony, it may help to have some basic information about fingerprints and
the fingerprint identification process.
Fingerprints are permanent. They are formed before birth, and they remain the same until after
death, barring deep scarring. The underside of our fingers and hands and feet are covered with
raised skin, called friction skin, which is usually covered with a thin film of perspiration or oil.
When the finger or hand touches an item, a reproduction of those ridges is left by means of that

perspiration or oil. That reproduction is called a latent print. Studies have found that no two
people have the same ridge arrangement anywhere on their fingers or hands.
When a fingerprint examiner receives evidence from investigating officers, the examiner develops
the print with powders or chemicals to make it visible, and then photographs the print. The
photograph is then studied using a standard process known as ACE-V, which stands for Analysis,

Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification.
In the ACE-V process, the examiner first determines whether the print is suitable for comparison,
based on whether there is adequate information in it. If so, then the examiner makes a side-byside comparison between the print found at the scene and a known print taken from a suspect.

"Based on feedback from participants in Study 1,who noted that our failure to specify the location of the prints left
open the possibility that the defendant had been a recent customer in the convenience store, we slightly altered the
hypothetical to make clear that the recovered prints came from the gun used in the robbery.
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The examiner evaluates the degree of similarity between the crime scene print and the known
print and can conclude that the prints are the same, different, or that the comparison is
inconclusive. Finally, if the examiner decides that the prints came from the same person, the
prints are passed to another examiner, to verify that conclusion.
This abbreviated description was based on the more detailed SWGFAST description of
the ACE-V process. Participants in the no-method-information condition did not receive
the above information before receiving the examiner's conclusion regarding a positive
match.

iii. Error information and error disclosure. Participants in the discounted-error condition
were told that the examiner stated the following: "While there is always the possibility of
human error in making an identification based on fingerprints, I have never made a
mistake. The chances are infinitesimal that the pattern in the print found at the scene of
the crime could have come from someone other than the defendant."" Participants in the
error-acknowledged condition were told that the examiner stated the following: "Recent
studies have found that fingerprint examiners do sometimes make mistakes about the
source of a fingerprint found at a crime scene. It is possible that the defendant was not the
source of the print found at the scene of this robbery."

iv. Error disclosure. Participants were told that the fingerprint examiner made one of the
above error statements as either part of his direct examination or during cross-examination.

b. Dependent Measures. After reading the case information, participants were asked to complete the same dependent measures used in Study 1 to assess perceived weight of the
evidence against the defendant (i.e., likelihood the defendant committed the crime on a
seven-point scale, confidence in likelihood judgment on a five-point scale, and, in all
conditions but the control condition, the probability defendant left fingerprints at the
crime scene on a 0-100 probability scale). These measures appeared on the same webpage
as the case description.
Finally, on a separate webpage, participants were asked whether they believed fingerprints were unique (same question as used in Study 1) and were asked to rate the reliability
of criminal identifications based on fingerprint comparisons (six-point scale: 1 = not reliable at all; midpoints were not labeled; 6 = extremely reliable). Participants were also asked
to respond to two questions designed to measure aversions to Type I and Type II errors:
"How serious an error is it for the criminal justice system to convict an innocent person?"
and "How serious an error is it for the criminal justice system to fail to convict a guilty
person?" Responses to these questions were given on a six-point scale (1= not a serious
error; midpoint was not labeled; 6 = an extremely serious error). The last question in the
experiment asked participants to report the frequency with which they watched any of the

This claim that fingerprint comparison error rates are "infinitesimal" comes from a real case (Cole 2011:472).
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crime scene investigation (CSI) television shows (six-point scale: never, rarely, once a
month, a few times a month, once a week, a few times a week).
B. Results

Analysis of variance in the mean ratings of the likelihood that the defendant was the robber
found a main effect only for the error information variable, F(1,631)= 27.49, p<0.001,
partial n' = 0.042. When the examiner downplayed the risk of error, the defendant's
likelihood of guilt was rated significantly higher than when the examiner admitted
that examiners can make errors and an error in the identification was possible
(Mrro.
I
= 5.41 vs. M
akldgd= 4.91). There were no other significant main or interaction effects on the qualitative measure of evidentiary weight." Compared to the strength
of the case without fingerprint evidence (i.e., the control condition), even the weakest
fingerprint evidence (i.e., the condition in which the risk of error was acknowledged only
on cross) led to significantly higher judgments that the defendant likely committed the
crime (all t tests comparing the control condition to each experimental condition were
significant at p < 0.05, even after applying the Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons) (see Table 3 for mean scores on the dependent measures for all 17 conditions).
Providing participants with bolstered match testimony increased confidence
in their judgments about the defendant's likely guilt (Mimple h,(Widvai,.tion = 3.50 vs.
2
MoIlsered individuaizaoon = 3.63, R(1, 629) = 4.17, p< 0.05, partial 11 = 0.007), but when the
examiner acknowledged the risk of error, as opposed to downplaying that risk, participant
confidence dropped (Meo dicone
3.69 vs. Meroaknldged = 3.43, F(1, 629) = 16.05, p < 0.001,
partial 112 = 0.025). No other main or interaction effects were found on the confidence
measure.
When the examiner acknowledged the possibility of error in his identification,

mean ratings of the probability that the defendant left his fingerprints at the crime
d = 76.10 vs. MAr
= 68.09, F(1, 633) = 18.54, p > 0.001,
scene decreased (Merer di
partial T12 = 0.028). No other significant effects were observed on the print probability
5
measure.'

As in Study 1, very few individual differences were observed. Regression analyses on
each of the dependent measures that included the range of individual difference measures
obtained found only that older participants tended to give higher ratings of the likelihood

that the defendant committed the robbery (P= 0.11, p<0.05), those who watched CSI

"The timing of the error disclosure approached significance, F11,631) = 3.32, p= 0.07, with the error acknowledgment that was brought out during cross-examination leading to the lowest likelihood ratings (i.e., failing to admit the
risk of error until cross-examination reduced the weight given to the examiner's testimony more than volunteering
this risk on direct). The interaction of error information with method information also approached significance,
1I1, 631) = 3.11, p= 0.08, with the addition of method information counteracting the effects of acknowledging a risk
of error.
' The main effect for the method information variable approached significance (111,633) = 3.46, p= 0.06), with
higher probability ratings associated with the examiner giving a method introduction before expressing his match
conclusion.
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Dependent Measure Means by Testimony Condition (Study 2)

Fingerprmt Evidence
Condition
Control
Simple individualization
No method information
EDD
EDC
EAD
EAC
Method information
EDD
EDC
EAD
EAC
Bolstered individualization
No method information
EDD
EDC
EAD
EAC
Method information
EDD
EDC
EAD
EAC

Likelihood Defendant
Was Robber
(1-7 Scale) M (SD)

Confidence in
LikelihoodJudgment
(1-5 Scale) M (SD)

Probability Defendant Left
Fingerprintsat Scene
(0-100 Scale) M (SD)

3.30 (.94)

3.15 (0.95)

5.41
5.38
4.93
4.66

(1.24)
(1.10)
(1.03)
(1.28)

3.56
3.52
3.33
3.34

(0.87)
(1.04)
(0.73)
(0.79)

75.41
74.03
68.34
63.02

(22.38)
(22.16)
(21.57)
(20.63)

5.44
5.37
5.20
5.11

(1.23)
(1.12)
(1.13)
(1.23)

3.71
3.65
3.41
3.42

(0.81)
(0.80)
(0.89)
(0.76)

77.27
71.12
74.71
69.34

(20.96)
(27.39)
(22.26)
(26.69)

5.51
5.48
4.93
4.59

(1.03)
(1.30)
(1.37)
(1.12)

3.66
3.85
3.48
3.39

(0.67)
(0.76)
(0.78)
(0.92)

74.27
78.57
65.95
63.34

(23.87)
(20.06)
(27.28)
(23.31)

5.20
5.51
5.21
4.68

(1.35)
(1.36)
(1.17)
(1.35)

3.70
3.85
3.63
3.46

(0.83)
(0.82)
(0.71)
(0.87)

76.56
81.56
74.38
65.61

(26.16)
(19.59)
(22.69)
(29.35)

NOTE: This table reports means on the dependent measures used in Study 2 by the type of testimony given by the

fingerprint examiner. The control condition contained no fingerprint examiner testimony. Participants received
either simple individualization testimony or bolstered individualization testimony, and they received either no
method information or information about the method used by the fingerprint examiner. In addition, participants
read that the fingerprint examiner either discounted or acknowledged the risk of error during direct testimony or
cross-examination (EDD= error risk discounted on direct; EDC= error risk discounted on cross; EAD= error risk
acknowledged on direct; EAC= error risk acknowledged on cross).

shows more often had greater confidence in their guiltjudgments (0 = 0.08, p < 0.05), and
those who were more concerned about false convictions gave lower estimates of the probability that the defendant left his prints at the crime scene (P = -0.08, p < 0.05)."
Also as in Study 1, participants in Study 2 overwhelmingly believed that fingerprints
are unique to individuals (94.5 percent, or 651 out of 689, responded affirmatively).
Participants also rated the reliability of fingerprint identifications as high (M= 4.43 on a
six-point scale). There were no differences in ratings of the reliability between participants
who were given the method information and those who were not (i.e., adding method

"iThe results of ordinary least squares regression are presented for all three dependent measures; similar results were
found using ordinal regression on the robber likelihood and confidence measures.
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information did not increase perceptions of the reliability of the method), suggesting a
high baseline belief in reliability rather than an effect of the experimental manipulation.'7
C. Discussion
The most consistent effect in Study 2 involved the error information variable: when the
examiner admitted that fingerprint examiners sometimes make mistakes and that the
identification in this case could thus be wrong, participants reduced theirjudgments about
the likelihood the defendant committed the crime, reduced their estimates of the probability that the defendant left his prints at the crime scene, and had less confidence in their
guiltjudgments. These effects were found regardless of the certitude with which a positive
match conclusion was stated, whether method information was provided, and whether the
possibility of error came out on direct or cross (although the trend in the means was for
revelation of the risk of error during cross-examination to have a more depressing effect on
judgments of guilt). In short, when an examiner admitted the undeniable fact that fingerprint examiners can make identification errors, and that the identification at hand was thus
not foolproof, significantly less weight was given to the fingerprint evidence. This result
replicates Study 1's finding that qualifying a positive match by admitting the prospect of
error undercuts the probative value of fingerprint evidence.
The strength of the match language had no independent effect on participant beliefs
about the likelihood of the defendant being the robber or having left his prints at the scene,
also replicating Study l's finding of no impact from bolstering simple match testimony.
However, participants were significantly more confident in their guilt judgments when
given the bolstered match testimony. That greater confidence may make their opinions
more resistant to change during jury deliberations.
Adding method information had no independent effect on beliefs about the likelihood the defendant was the robber or the probability the defendant left fingerprints at the
scene. The effect of method information on print probability estimates approached significance, with the addition of method information increasing estimates of the probability that
the defendant left prints at the scene, but this result should be viewed cautiously given its
tentative nature. Participants exposed to the examiner who testified on direct that his
method was reliable and then acknowledged on cross a possible misidentification rated the
general reliability of fingerprint identifications the lowest. Thus, our results suggest that an
examiner who claims infallibility on direct will be viewed skeptically after a cross that elicits
error-risk concessions, but an examiner who on direct describes her method in reasonable
7

' General reliability ratings were marginally sensitive to the combination of error information and method information (11, 633) = 3.77, p= 0.053), and the main effect for timing of the error disclosure (direct vs. cross) approached
significance (111, 633) = 3.32, p= 0.07). An examination of mean reliability ratings by condition revealed that
participants who received error information rated the reliability of fingerprint identifications to be lower, but
participants who received method information during direct examination and then an admission of a risk of error
during cross-examination tended to give the lowest reliability ratings: the contradiction between the confident claims
on direct and the admission on cross of less-than-perfect reliability of the examiner's method may have affected
general views about the reliability of fingerprint identification. Because of these possible experimental effects on the
general reliability measure, scores on the general reliability measure were not used as a moderator or individual
difference variable.
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terms, including acknowledging some risk of error, may be able to limit the negative
impact of an effective cross-examination or contrary fingerprint evidence presented by the
defense.
There were few individual differences in Study 2, and we did not replicate our finding
from Study I that persons of different races viewed the fingerprint evidence differently. We
did find, interestingly, that more frequent viewing of forensic science television dramas
increased participant confidence in their evaluations of the fingerprint evidence, suggesting that the empirical debate over the impact of media on evidential expectations should
continue (see, e.g., Tyler 2006; Shelton 2008). Finally, confirming the results from Study 1,
the overwhelming majority of respondents in Study 2 believed that individuals have unique
fingerprints.

V.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

In two large, diverse samples of adults, we found that a fingerprint examiner's testimony
that a suspect's fingerprints matched latent prints recovered from a crime scene significantly increased participants' beliefs in the guilt of this suspect, but the particular terminology used to convey this positive match information had little impact on participants'
judgments about the guilt of the suspect. Both studies found no effect for different ways of
framing an individualization conclusion or bolstering that conclusion, such as with method
information or claims that it was a practical impossibility that another person could be the
source of the crime scene prints.
These results indicate that while the legal and forensics community may be rightly
concerned about the manner in which forensic conclusions are expressed, modest testimonial conclusions may be just as problematic as overstated conclusions. The results also
call into question the effectiveness of proposals that aim to reduce the weight given to
fingerprint testimony by having examiners replace exaggerated claims of certainty and
specificity with unadorned claims that simply state that a positive match has been made.
Our results suggest that participants encoded examiner testimony as a dichotomous
variable-as "match" or "no match"-with elaboration by the examiner on the strength of
the match or certainty of the conclusion having little impact once the testimony was coded
as a match.' 8
Our basic finding that different ways of framing an examiner's match conclusion did
not matter should be viewed in conjunction with our finding that people generally view

"Such an encoding process would be consistent with fuzzy-trace theory (e.g., Hans & Reyna 2011; Reyna & Brainerd
1995), which assigns primary importance in judgments and decision making to the "gist" meaning extracted from
observed information and leads to categorical judgments of the kind we observed across the experimental conditions
with respect to the impact of positive, inconclusive, and negative match conclusions. However, fuzzy-trace theory
would suggest that when the experimental task called for finer-grainedjudgments, as with our quantitative measure
of evidentiary weight, then verbatim representations of the examiner's testimony should have played a greater role in
judgments. Yet we found few differences on the quantitative measure of evidentiary weight. Future studies should
more closely examine how examiner testimony is encoded and the relative impact of gist and verbatim representations of examiner testimony on quantitatively measured evidentiary weights and on categorical jury verdicts.
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fingerprint identifications as reliable and believe that fingerprints are unique sources of
identification. Thus, even the simplest positive match testimony can have a great impact on
jurors: testimony that fingerprints "matched" appears to be taken as a strong statement of
individualization that needs no bolstering. The bolstering language appears to have just
reaffirmed what laypeople already believed about fingerprint evidence.
Our studies also shed light on a possibly more effective way of qualifying fingerprint
examiner conclusions: when the fingerprint examiner admitted that his method is not
foolproof and that his conclusion in this case could be in error, that disclosure had a
significant negative impact on the evidence. This approach appears to have been more
effective than qualifying the match conclusion because it contradicted preexisting beliefs
about the reliability of fingerprint identifications and put fingerprint identifications in a
new light. Future studies should examine more closely lay beliefs about the fingerprint
identification process so that courts and parties can develop methods for separating fact
from fiction in jurors' consideration of fingerprint evidence.
Our finding that bringing out the risk of error on cross had an equal or greater
impact on lay interpretations of the examiner's testimony than voluntary disclosure during
direct examination contradicts the findings of Koehler (2011) and McQuiston-Surrett and
Saks (2009). These mixed results indicate that the impact of cross-examination may depend
greatly on how the information that is revealed during cross-examination relates to lay
assumptions about a particular type of evidence and how that information compares to
claims made by the witness during direct examination. We did not explore the impact
of proficiency information that was tailored to the particular examiner testifying, but
our results suggest that such error-rate information and how it is conveyed could greatly
affect the weight given to the examiner's testimony. Our results also suggest that crossexamination of an overconfident examiner that garners an admission of fallibility may
negatively impactjurors and, conversely, that forensic analysts may be wise to acknowledge
their fallibility on direct to avoid such negative effects.
In addition, the impact of exclusion evidence and inconclusive match testimony
should receive more scrutiny. Perhaps our participants appropriately ignored testimony
about an inconclusive match by rating the strength of evidence in this case the same as the
control case, but arguably our participants gave the exclusion testimony too little weight by
not rating the strength of evidence in that case lower than the control case. It is possible that
laypersons generally discount exclusion evidence, but the weight given to such an exclusion
will likely depend on the whether a credible explanation exists for how this defendant could
be both guilty and not the source of fingerprints. There are certainly troubling examples of
serious criminal cases in which jurors apparently discounted forensic findings excluding
criminal defendants who later had their innocence confirmed by DNA testing (Garrett &
Neufeld 2009), but only future studies can determine how common such discounting is and
whether our result was simply an artifact of our method, which did not control for participants' assumptions about the other evidence that the government might have had against
the defendant.
As with any research involving mock cases, our studies have limitations. We did not
provide full case details, we focused exclusively on fingerprint evidence, and we did not
utilize group deliberations, jury instructions, or attorney arguments. The participants were
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not asked to reach a verdict. Our goal was to examine the marginal effects of fingerprint
evidence, compared to the control case, on laypersons generally, and to examine the
marginal effects of different ways of packaging a fingerprint examiner's conclusions. These
marginal effects may be easily overwhelmed in actual trials by other evidence or by the
demeanor and personal characteristics of the examiner who testifies. We consciously chose
to examine a crime in which no one was physically harmed to minimize the threat of
outcome bias. A crime involving harm to a victim may elicit strong motives to convict, which
may in turn color the way evidence is interpreted and assimilated (e.g., Mazzocco et al.
2004).
Notwithstanding these limitations, our studies shed new light on issues raised in the
NRC Report (2009) and the NIST/NIJ Report (2012) and raise new issues for study. Our
results suggest that the precise terminology used by fingerprint examiners to convey an
individualization conclusion may have relatively little impact on the weight given to that
identification, even when that terminology makes exorbitant claims about the certainty of
the identification. Thus, the focus by the NRC and the NIST/NIJ taskforce on specific
match terminology may be misplaced.
Instead, a focus on error-rate information may be warranted. Our results support
Jennifer Mnookin's recommendation that "[w]hat courts really ought to consider requiring, in many cases, as a minimum prerequisite to admissibility is simply much better error
rate information about examiners' abilities in practice" (Mnookin 2010:1243). Our
research demonstrates that admissions by fingerprint examiners that their method is not
infallible and that a person other than the defendant could have supplied the crime scene
prints can significantly affect the weight given to a fingerprint examiner's testimony.
Given the indisputable fact that fingerprint examinations are not infallible and that
someone other than the defendant may always be the source of crime scene prints, there
is no justification for claims of infallibility or near infallibility by fingerprint examiners.
Such claims are not seen as expected braggadocio that is easily ignored byjurors; rather,
such claims confirm many people's preexisting beliefs about fingerprint evidence and
portray examiner testimony in an overly positive light. As one fingerprint examiner put it
recently, "when we say, 'I am 100% certain of my conclusion,' we might mean that we have
conducted a careful examination, reached the best conclusion possible with the data
available, and that we would not have reported that conclusion unless we were confident
that we had done our work well. But what does the jury hear? They hear, 'I'm an expert,
and I'm telling you that this conclusion is fact and cannot possibly be wrong' " (Eldridge
2012:8).
Finally, greater attention should be paid to the problem of how to appropriately
express opinions across a host of forensics for which no probabilistic basis for rendering
conclusions exists. The organizations developing such standards should focus on more than
just the expert's bare conclusion and whether that conclusion is stated in qualitative or
quantitative terms. Exactly how a forensic expert communicates an individualization conclusion may be much less important than the information the expert provides about the
reliability of the process used to reach that conclusion, the risk of error, and the degree to
which that information confirms or contradicts assumptions thatjurors already hold about
the reliability of fingerprint evidence.
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